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Abstract: 
This article investigates the complex relationship between the practices of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the field of refugee protection and the more 
recent political rationality of ‘migration management’ by drawing from governmentality 
studies. It is argued that the dissemination of UNHCR’s own refugee protection discourse 
creates certain ‘figures of migration’ allowing for justifying the build-up and perfection of 
border controls, which in turn enable any attempt to ‘manage’ migration in the first place. 
Conversely, the problematisation of population movements as ‘mixed migration flows’ allows 
UNHCR to enlarge its field of activitiy despite of its narrow mandate by actively participating 
in the promotion, planning and implementation of migration management systems. Based on 
ethnographic research in Turkey and Morocco, this article demonstrates, furthermore, that 
UNHCR's refugee protection discourse and the emerging migration management paradigm 
are both based on a methodological nationalism, share an authoritarian potential and yield de-
politicising effects. What UNHCR’s recent embracing of the migration management paradigm 
together with its active involvement in respective practices then brings to the fore is that 
UNHCR is part of a global police of populations. 
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Introduction 
On the occasion of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 
held in New York in 2006, the organisation of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) underlined in a comment that it regards “[r]efugee protection and 
migration management [...as] distinct yet complimentary activities” (UNHCR 2006: 1). 
UNHCR’s stance towards migration management also found its way into the International 
Agenda for Migration Management, which was published by the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) as the central outcome of the Berne Initiative in 2005: “The regime for 
international protection of refugees, including asylum, is a separate, distinct but 
complementary regime from the process of international migration management […]” (Berne 
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Initiative 2005: 7). Despite its ambitious title, this document is just another version of the 
many intergovernmental forum conclusions that accompanied the emergence of the diffuse 
concept of ‘migration management’ as the dominating paradigm of contemporary migration 
policies. In a preliminary definition, migration management can be conceived of as a ‘global 
policy discourse’ that seeks to counter security oriented (or obsessed) ‘zero-immigration’ 
policies by inserting and lobbying for an economic, neoliberal and more pragmatic rationale 
into migration policies (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 8-9). The migration management discourse 
emphasises that the creation of “triple win situations” for countries of origin, destination 
countries and migrants alike is only possible under the condition that migration proceeds 
“orderly” through bi- and multilateral agreements (Ghosh 2000; 2012). It therefore promotes 
the creation of more opportunities for ‘legal’ migration, while simultaneously reaffirming the 
need for restrictive measures against ‘illegal’ migration (Kalm 2010).  
UNHCR’s positive stance towards migration management, which is indicated by its 
characterisation as a ‘complimentary’ activity to refugee protection, marks an important shift 
in the refugee agency’s previous reluctance to address any issue of international migration 
until the 1990s (Scalettaris 2007). UNHCR representatives were actively involved in the 
regional forums of the biennial consultation process, which preceded the publication of the 
International Agenda for Migration Management. 
However, precisely because the second paragraph of UNHCR’s statute stipulates it to 
be a strictly “humanitarian” and “non-political organisation”, whose mandate is restricted to 
matters of asylum (UNHCR 2010a: 6), the refugee agency’s embracing of the migration 
management paradigm raises many questions. Drawing on an analytical perspective inspired 
by Michel Foucault’s lectures on governmentality (2007), this article addresses some of them, 
including: What are the specific characteristics of the refugee protection discourse allowing 
UNHCR to depict migration management as a ‘complimentary’ activity? How do the refugee 
protection discourse and the more recent rationality of migration management interact with 
one another? And, finally, how does the embracing of the migration management paradigm 
alter UNHCR’s field of activities? 
In general, the concept of governmentality emphasises the contingency of specific 
rationales of government and how these in turn shape the particular forms and appearances of 
“governmental technologies” i.e. the various means, calculations and procedures through 
which government is accomplished (Rose and Miller 1992). In this vein, we follow the 
reading of migration management as a political rationality, which, emerging from power 
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relations and inscribed in governing practices, produces a particular knowledge about 
migration including certain convictions about how it should be governed (Kalm 2010).  
Extending Michel Foucault’s famous definition of government from the domestic to 
the international sphere, Michael Merlingen regards the activity of international governmental 
organisations (IGOs) as the “international conduct of the conduct of countries” (Merlingen 
2003: 367). Instead of imposing their will on national governments, IGOs try to shape the 
discursive environment through the problematisation of certain phenomena, which are then 
rendered as targets for political interventions; often at least some of these interventions are 
provided by the IGOs themselves. Following Michel Foucault’s governmentality framework, 
which assumes a constitutive relationship between the production of knowledge and the 
exercise of power, we suggest that both the discourse on migration management and on 
refugee protection are based on and lead to a categorisation of migrants. We content, 
moreover, that the emergent political rationality of migration management can easily draw on 
the established refugee protection discourse as articulated by UNHCR. For the latter produces 
and provides the categories or “figures of migration” (Karakayalı and Rigo 2010), which 
legitimise the build-up of border controls that enable any attempt to order or ‘manage’ 
migration in the first place.
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Using Morocco and Turkey as case studies, this paper illustrates that the refugee 
protection discourse functions as a catalyst for the dissemination of migration management 
practices. Conversely, UNHCR’s endorsement of the migration management paradigm is 
related to the creation of new “policy related labels” (Scalettaris 2007: 37). The 
problematisation of certain migratory movements as ‘mixed migration flows’ permits 
UNHCR to enlarge its field of activities by actively participating in the promotion and 
implementation of migration management procedures. What the supposedly humanitarian 
organisation’s outright engagement in migration management and related rebordering 
practices brings to the fore is that UNHCR is actually part of a global “police of populations” 
(Walters 2002: 282) and is itself actively involved in the policing of populations and borders.  
Indeed, UNHCR belongs to the most important IGOs in the design of the norms and 
appearances that characterise emergent regimes of border control and migration management. 
                                                          
1
 According to some critical scholars, by its attempt to classify and categorise migratory movements, migration 
research creates the ‘figures of migration’ in the first place, which state attempts of regulation and control can tie 
on to. These figures of migration – like the ‘guest worker’, the ‘asylum-seeker’ or, currently, the ‘illegal migrant’ 
– are historically contingent constructions that “do not represent social groups but instead conceptually reflect 
relations of migration” (Karakayalı and Rigo 2010: 129). Consequently, we do not regard these “policy related 
labels” (Scalettaris 2007: 37) as analytical categories, but as objects of inquiry themselves. Nevertheless, we 
mostly refrain from using them with inverted commas in order to make the text more readable. 
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However, the study of UNHCR and other international agencies has only received little 
attention so far (Andrijašević and Walters 2010; Geiger and Pécoud 2010). In the case of 
UNHCR, Jerôme Valluy (2007) has noted that the agency’s monopoly over knowledge 
production on asylum, refugees and forced migration sharply contrasts with the fact that the 
agency has seldom been the object of study itself. This article aims to contribute to the scarce, 
but burgeoning literature that follows Giulia Scalettaris’ call to make the refugee regime a 
subject of critical inquiry (2007). 
It can be assumed that UNHCR’s role in ‘conducting the conduct of countries’ as well 
as the function of the refugee protection discourse as a catalyst for the promotion of migration 
management practices becomes obvious particularly in countries, where migration has not 
been framed and treated as a ‘problem’ that needs to be regulated until a short time ago. 
Morocco and Turkey are chosen as case studies, since this precondition seems to be met in 
both countries. In its endeavour to involve both states as countries of origin and transit into its 
restrictive migration policies, the EU construed migration as a ‘problem’ requiring political 
regulation (Piraldi and Rahmi 2007; Hess and Karakayalı 2007). As important transit and 
source countries bordering the EU, Morocco and Turkey are both focal points of the EU’s 
externalisation strategy and its attempt “to develop EU-Regional Protection Programmes in 
partnership with the third countries concerned and in close consultation and cooperation with 
UNHCR” (European Council 2004: 21). 
This article proceeds in four steps: The first section highlights the dichotomous logic 
of the refugee protection discourse by analysing UNHCR’s training of border guards and its 
involvement in the construction of ‘removal centres’ in Turkey. The second section turns to 
the case study of Morocco and focuses on the narrative of the ‘mixed migration flows’ as the 
crucial link between the refugee protection discourse and migration management. 
Investigating UNHCR’s dealing with refugee protests in Morocco, the third section elaborates 
on the authoritarian character of the refugee protection discourse, a characteristic which it 
shares with the overall migration management paradigm. Before concluding, the fourth 
section identifies methodological nationalism and a depoliticisation of the governmental 
interventions they call for as two features, which are shared by the refugee protection and 
migration management discourses, thereby explaining their alleged compatibility. 
 
1. Producing ‘Villains’ and ‘Victims’: UNHCR in Turkey 
UNHCR is present in Turkey since 1960. Although no formal agreement has been signed with 
the Turkish government until today, UNHCR carries out refugee status determination (RSD) 
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procedures in close cooperation with Turkish authorities. This strong involvement results 
from two main specifics of Turkish asylum politics: (I) Turkey signed the Geneva Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol with a ‘geographical limitation’, through which it is only bound to 
recognise people as refugees who have fled from European states. By carrying out RSD itself, 
UNHCR enables also people from non-European states to seek asylum in Turkey. (II) In case 
they are recognised as refugees, UNHCR has to ‘resettle’ them to countries other than Turkey, 
as they are not allowed to stay in Turkey permanently. Although since 1994 there exists a 
‘parallel procedure’, involving both UNHCR and the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MOI), 
the UN refugee agency practically single-handedly conducts the RSD of asylum-seekers, 
since the Turkish authorities largely follow its decisions (Kirişçi 2012). 
Through RSD, UNHCR institutionalises a bureaucratic routine that operates along the 
dichotomous logic of the refugee protection discourse. Using the example of Turkey, critical 
scholars have argued that the logic of this discourse implicates a split-up of the social field of 
migration into ‘refugees’, who are constructed as being in need of protection and whose cross-
border movements are recognised as legitimate, and ‘illegal’ migrants, whose movements’ 
legitimacy is denied (Hess and Karakayalı 2007). What the practice of a sharp binary 
selection in UNHCR’s RSD implicates is a criminalisation of the majority of migrating 
people. In other words, UNHCR literally fabricates ‘illegal’ migrants in its RSD procedures: 
those who do not fall in the narrow category of the refugee are officially attested to be 
‘illegals’ (Andrijašević et al. 2005). The categories provided by the refugee protection 
discourse do then not only constitute conceptual starting points for the migration management 
rationality. Rather, these categories are enacted and literally filled with life through RSD. 
Following Michael Merlingen (2003: 368), RSD can be understood as a ‘biopolitical 
technique’, which has very real effects on the lives of those granted or denied the legal status 
of refugee by bringing them into being as tangible targets for subsequent migration 
management techniques like resettlement, detention or deportation. Hereby, UNHCR actively 
participates in rendering governable and ‘managing’ populations in Turkey.  
Besides RSD, one of UNHCR’s major activities consists in providing training 
seminars, in which, since 1997 and with financial aid from EU funds, Turkish officials are 
instructed in questions relating to asylum (Andrijašević et al. 2005). In addition to officials of 
the MOI, security forces of the Gendarmerie, the army and the coastguards receive lessons in 
asylum and refugee law (internal UNHCR statistic on ‘capacity building’; UNHCR 2010b). In 
the words of Michael Merlingen these classes, teaching Turkish officials to differentiate 
between ‘refugees’ and ‘illegal migrants’, could be called a form of “IGO pedagogy” (2003: 
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386). Through this biopolitical technique, UNHCR tries to ‘conduct the conduct of countries’ 
by inserting a logic of “humanitarian government” (Fassin 2007: 151) into migration policy 
issues.
2
 This proves to be especially effective in the context of Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations: A special unit inside the UNHCR deals with the country’s accession process. 
Here as well, the refugee agency problematises migration in terms of ‘forced’ and ‘legitimate’ 
versus ‘voluntary’ but ‘illegitimate’ movements along the binary distinction ‘refugee/illegal’. 
This happens in close contact with the Turkish ministerial administration, mainly through the 
training of Turkish officials in refugee legislation. During negotiations, EU officials can 
easily draw on this discourse, in order to demand the installation of a ‘comprehensive asylum 
system’ as well as the lifting of Turkey’s ‘geographical limitation’ to the Geneva Convention, 
based on the humanitarian argument that an improvement of refugee protection is urgently 
needed (Hess and Karakayalı 2007). According to Turkish migration scholar Kemal Kirişçi 
(2012), although the limitation remains intact in the recent modification of Turkish asylum 
law, the lifting of the limitation no longer represents a taboo. This development can, in fact, 
be regarded as a direct result of UNHCR’s seminars with Turkish officials. The interviews 
conducted with UNHCR employees in Turkey confirm Kirişçi’s findings: The trust and 
confidence that have been built over the years have culminated in UNHCR’s very active 
involvement in the drafting of Turkey’s first, recently adopted asylum legislation. 
UNHCR’s regularly published Global Appeals constitute another example for a 
disciplinary technique. They measure Turkey’s progress in installing an asylum system 
against the norms set by the Geneva Convention (UNHCR 2009). What these and other 
UNHCR reports establish are a “normalising gaze” and a “meticulous knowledge”, by which 
Turkey as a target country and reference object “can be corrected and controlled” (Merlingen 
2003: 369- 370).  
Undoubtedly, this directly supports EU demands towards Turkey. In fact, all of 
UNHCR’s efforts have to be seen in the context of the EU’s attempts to declare Turkey a 
‘safe third country’ as a means to outsource and territorially shift the responsibility for 
refugee protection to Turkey. It is the juridical construct ‘safe third country’ that will allow 
EU member states to reject any asylum claim as unfounded if the applicant entered the EU by 
passing through a country (Turkey), where s/he allegedly could have sought protection. Since 
the Turkish government fears to be used as a ‘migration buffer’, it has announced to negotiate 
                                                          
2
 Fassin defines humanitarian government as “the administration of human collectives in the name of a higher 
moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action” 
(2007: 151). 
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readmission agreements with countries of origin and transit in order to be able to deport failed 
asylum-seekers and ‘unwanted’ migrants itself (Şemşit 2008).3 Through its activities, 
UNHCR not only operates as a ‘catalyst’ in the externalisation of the EU migration regime 
(Andrijašević et al. 2005). As a side effect of the agency’s governmental intervention in 
Turkey, its demand for an expansion of refugee protection also translates into a perfection and 
dissemination of border control instruments migration management practices are relying on. 
Similarly, the distinction between “villains and victims of migration” (Bojadžijev and 
Karakayalı 2007: 206), i.e. ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘needy refugees’ can legitimise stricter 
border controls, thereby contributing to a securitisation of migration in Turkey (Ratfisch and 
Scheel 2010). UNHCR’s participation in the formation of border guards even legitimises 
border and migration controls as ‘humanitarian actions’ on the argument that these activities 
serve the identification and hence the protection of refugees (Hess and Karakayalı 2007): 
 
“Once Integrated Border Management Systems are established in Turkey and put in place, 
[…] if there are safeguards introduced along with measures that curb illegal migration, then it 
would be a positive impact for refugees.” (Interview UNHCR staff member, Ankara, 2009) 
 
UNHCR’s positive stance towards migration management procedures does not only provide 
authorities with humanitarian arguments for their justification, but is also reflected in its 
active involvement in the elaboration and creation of new migration management schemes 
and techniques. For instance, UNHCR already actively participates in the construction of 
‘reception centres’ in six Turkish cities, each of these centres having a capacity of 750 
persons. The UN agency takes an active part in the planning process by drafting 
recommendations concerning humanitarian standards inside the camps and by providing 
training in ‘centre management’ to future employees (UNHCR 2010b). According to the 
UNHCR employee cited above, the organisation supports the centralised accommodation of 
refugees in reception centres – under the condition of access for civil society stakeholders –, 
because this would allegedly offer them better ‘protection’. The UNHCR Global Report 2009 
highlights, however, that “[f]unding was made available and sites were identified” for the 
construction of – inter alia – “two removal centres for rejected asylum-seekers and illegal 
migrants” (UNHCR 2010b: 297). In other words, UNHCR actively participates in the 
                                                          
3
 Until 2008, the Turkish government had already signed readmission agreements with Greece, Kyrgyzstan, 
Romania, Syria, and Ukraine, while it negotiates further readmission agreements with at least 12 more countries 
as well as the EU (Şemşit 2008). 
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construction of deportation facilities whose purposes are not limited to refugee protection but 
will serve migration management in general, involving deportation and forced return. The 
dichotomous logic of the refugee protection discourse materialises here in form of an 
architectural migration control structure that provides the necessary means for operatively 
carrying out migration management. 
In this context it should be noted that a tougher action against ‘illegal’ migrants is not 
simply a by-product of the refugee protection discourse’s binary distinction. It is in fact 
actively propagated by UNHCR as an instrument to strengthen the acceptance of (‘genuine’) 
refugees among the Turkish population. It is meant to counter the mixing-up of the categories 
‘refugee’ and ‘illegal migrant’ in media coverage and public perception:  
 
“In order to deal with that kind of public opinion, it is on the one hand good to establish 
strong border management systems to […] address the needs of the country in fighting illegal 
migration. So that those who are abusing the system or who are not needing protection do not 
[cause] those who genuinely need international protection or should be protected to be left out 
of the system or be discarded just because of the general negative public opinion or just 
because of the general burden on the country.” (Interview UNHCR staff member, Ankara, 
2009) 
 
Through this narrative, UNHCR not only propagates an expansion of border and migration 
controls, but also provides for a legitimisation strategy by presenting restrictive controls as a 
necessary prerequisite for effective refugee protection. As indicated in the organisation’s 
outlook for 2011, UNHCR is even willing to “facilitat[e] the humane return of irregular 
migrants who do not have protection needs” in close cooperation with IOM (UNHCR 2009: 
36). By promoting, legitimising and participating in the proliferation of these measures, 
UNHCR – as illustrated in the case of Turkey – actively engages in a wide range of migration 
management techniques. 
 
2. From the ‘Problem’ of Mixed Migration Flows to its ‘Solution’: UNHCR in Morocco 
In contrast to Turkey, UNHCR has been present with an international delegation in Morocco 
only since November 2004. The fact that the Moroccan government only granted UNHCR 
diplomatic status in July 2007 after intensive political pressure by the EU illustrates its 
disapproval concerning one of the UN agency’s main goals: to facilitate a national asylum 
system in Morocco (Valluy 2007). 
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In order to achieve this goal, UNHCR organises workshops for NGO’s and other civil 
society actors in order to make them committed to refugee protection. UNHCR in that sense 
attempts to actively generate pressure ‘from below’ on the government (Valluy 2007). 
UNHCR staff in interviews confirmed that the bulk of the UN agency’s budget in Turkey 
(which has almost tripled to 1.5 million € in 2008 through additional funds from the EU-
MEDA programme) is actually spent on this very form of ‘capacity building’. UNHCR’s 
workshops in Morocco again are an example of ‘IGO pedagogy’ in order to ‘conduct the 
conduct of countries’. In this example UNHCR ‘pedagogy’ rather influences on civil society 
actors than on government officials (as in the case of Turkey).  
Yet, from UNHCR’s own perspective, this ‘pedagogy’ has not achieved the intended 
results so far. Its attempts to approach local NGO’s rather led to a division: While UNHCR 
has successfully enlisted some of them for cooperation, many others have been rejecting to 
engage with the UNHCR. Many Moroccan NGOs fear to be instrumentalised and exploited 
for externalising refugee protection from EU member states to Morocco. According to this 
view, the EU solely finances and supports UNHCR’s asylum implementation project in order 
to declare Morocco a ‘safe third country’. In this context, the little progress UNHCR has 
made so far can essentially be attributed to direct EU pressure (Valluy 2007). 
In the Moroccan context, the narrative of ‘mixed migration flows’ proves to be 
politically more significant: Propagated by UNHCR, this narrative is used to express the 
assumption that asylum-seekers tend to travel along the same routes as other migrants do. The 
concept was developed in the 1990s under the label ‘migration-asylum-nexus’ by scholars 
like Stephen Castles (2007) in order to demonstrate the continuity between ‘forced’ and 
‘voluntary’ migration at all stages of the migration process and to criticise the refugee 
definition of the Geneva Convention as being too narrow. In December 2000 the concept was 
taken up by the UNHCR during its ‘Global Consultations on International Protection’. It 
became instrumentalised in order to counter the allegation, whereupon most asylum-seekers 
were in fact ‘economic migrants’ (UNHCR 2007a). Contrary to migration scholars like 
Castles, who emphasise that the motivations for migration are always mixed, UNHCR 
stresses the need for a clear-cut distinction between the two categories, thereby insisting, at 
least indirectly, that such simple differentiations can actually be made on the ground:  
 
“[m]igrants are fundamentally different from refugees and, thus, are treated very differently 
under international law. Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to 
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improve their lives. Refugees are forced to flee to save their lives or preserve their freedom.” 
(UNHCR 2013) 
 
This simple differentiation undoubtedly is in stark disagreement with the research findings 
and arguments of most contemporary migration scholars. Yet, it provides the basis for the 
UNHCR’s ‘mixed flow’ narrative – a narrative that constitutes the decisive discursive 
conjunction between the UN agencies original task of refugee protection and the supposedly 
purely technical procedures and means of migration management, stretching far beyond the 
particular field of refugee and asylum politics. 
 
“UNHCR’s clearly defined responsibilities for refugees and other persons of concern do not 
extend to migrants generally. It is, at the same time, a fact that refugees often move within 
broader mixed migratory flows. […] There is therefore a need to achieve a better 
understanding and management of the interface between asylum and migration, both of which 
UNHCR should promote, albeit consistent with its mandate, so that people in need of 
protection find it, people who wish to migrate have options other than through resort to the 
asylum channel, and unscrupulous smugglers cannot benefit through wrongful manipulation 
of available entry possibilities.” (UNHCR 2003: 46) 
 
What this statement, taken from the chapter ‘Protecting refugees within broader migration 
movements’ in the UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection, clearly illustrates is that it is the 
reference to ‘mixed flows’, which enables UNHCR to enlarge its activities to all other areas 
and dimensions of migration policy. UNHCR commits itself to all aspects of the migration 
management paradigm by affirming the following aims: 
 
“1. Better identification of and proper response to the needs of asylum-seekers and refugees 
including access to protection within the broader context of migration management; 2. 
Strengthened international efforts to combat smuggling and trafficking, 3. Better data 
collection and research on the nexus between asylum and migration, 4. Reduction of irregular 
or secondary movements 5. Closer dialogue and cooperation between UNHCR and IOM, 6. 
Information campaigns to ensure potential migrants are aware of the prospects for legal 
migration and the dangers of human smuggling and trafficking 7. Return of persons found not 
to be in need of international protection.” (UNHCR 2003: 47-51) 
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This enormous enlargement of UNHCR’s activities is justified on the base of the assumption 
that the refugee agency’s planned involvement in migration management would enhance 
refugee protection standards in the face of the supposedly new phenomenon of ‘mixed 
migration flows’ (van der Klaauw 2009: 61-63). What remains embezzled in this argument is 
the repressive effect that UNHCR’s ‘broader approach’ has on all those who don’t comply 
with the narrow refugee definition of the Geneva Convention. In July 2006, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres presented a 10-point plan of action dealing 
with the issue of “Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration”. The envisaged measures do not 
only translate UNHCR’s endeavour to participate in migration management into practice. 
They also demonstrate the restrictive and repressive effects resulting from the asserted need to 
strictly differentiate between ‘genuine refugees’ and ‘irregular’ migrants. According to point 
three of this 10-point plan, UNHCR intends to participate in the training of border guards in 
order to ‘filter’ asylum-seekers from the ‘mixed migration flows’ and grant them access to 
asylum procedures. What should happen with all those not meeting the criteria of the Geneva 
Convention is stated in point nine:  
 
“For people who are found not to be refugees, and for those who do not wish to seek asylum, 
expeditious return in safety and dignity is usually the preferred response of states. UNHCR 
may, on a good offices basis, assist states in the return of people who are not in need of 
international protection where this is the most appropriate and agreed solution.” (UNHCR 
2007a: 5).  
 
In other words, UNHCR plans to actively participate in the process of carrying out 
deportations.To this end, it actively calls for the conclusion and implementation of 
readmission agreements (UNHCR 2003). 
Following a report published by UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation 
Service (PDES), the UNHCR office in Morocco has already proposed an “innovative 
approach” (PDES 2010: 24) on how UNHCR’s envisaged involvement in the organisation 
and execution of deportations could be put in practice. As in Turkey, UNHCR intends to 
expand its existing cooperation with the IOM, which has been conducting ‘voluntary assisted 
return programs’ for several years. In order to increase the number of rejected asylum-seekers 
who agree to participate in this program, UNHCR has suggested to elaborate particular 
“profiles of rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants […] in order to support the 
realistic identification of candidates for return and to determine potential rates of return” 
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(PDES 2010: 24). The underlying reason for the introduction of this biopolitical technique for 
the management of populations is found in the same report. Here, an effective ‘return policy’ 
is regarded as a necessary precondition for an effective refugee protection in Morocco:  
 
“If effective arrangements could be put in place to support the dignified return of rejected 
asylum-seekers and those no longer pursuing asylum claims, this may provide the [Moroccan] 
authorities with the encouragement needed to assume more fully their responsibilities in 
relation to refugees.” (PDES 2010: 24) 
 
On the operational level, UNHCR’s ‘broader approach’ is also reflected in the UN Theme 
Group on Migration, which was formed at the end of 2006 as a means to implement the 10-
point-plan of action in Morocco (UNHCR 2007b). The purpose of this group chaired by 
UNHCR’s chief of mission in Morocco is to “support” the Moroccan authorities in the 
development and implementation of a “comprehensive policy to manage all dimensions of 
migration flows” to, from and through Morocco (UNHCR 2007c; van der Klaauw 2009: 77-
78). Besides the strategies of the Agenda for Protection cited above, the measures proposed 
include: (1) legal training in the formulation and implementation of migration and asylum 
laws for Moroccan authorities, (2) encouragement of regional cooperation in matters of 
migration management, and (3) the implementation of development projects that provide 
socio-economic alternatives to migration (UNHCR 2007c). Hence, UNHCR takes actually the 
lead in the overall development and implementation of a comprehensive migration 
management system in Morocco.  
Ultimately, the narrative of ‘mixed migration flows’ legitimises the perfection of 
border controls. While the narrative originally referred to the impossibility to differentiate 
unequivocally between ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ in practice, UNHCR derives from it the 
necessity to render border controls more effective and precise. This reversal of the original 
logic of the ‘migration-asylum-nexus‘ concept is illustrated by the proposal in the PDES 
report to consider “the introduction of fingerprinting or some other form of biometrics” in 
order to make it impossible for rejected asylum-seekers to re-register with UNHCR under a 
new identity (PDES 2010: 27). Accordingly, UNHCR tries to draw and stabilise a clear-cut 
boundary between ‘genuine refugees’ and ‘irregular migrants’ by technological means. 
What UNHCR’s activities in Morocco demonstrate, in sum, is that the narrative of 
‘mixed migration flows’ justifies an unprecedented enlargement of the agency’s field of 
activity in order to include all aspects of migration management procedures. This shift results 
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in restrictive effects and negative consequences for the majority of migrating people, 
including those labelled as asylum seekers. 
 
3. Of Speechless Emissaries and Their Advocate 
Although the number of asylum seekers and refugees who have been deported by Moroccan 
authorities has declined significantly over the past few years, UNHCR is still unable to 
guarantee them an effective protection against deportations to Algeria until today (PDES 
2010). In addition, UNHCR’s ambitious efforts in the domain of ‘capacity building’ contrast 
with the limited funds the organisation spends on concrete aid for the 750 refugees who have 
been recognised by the office in Rabat until June 2009. As Fiston Massamba (2006), an 
activist of the Conseil des Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc, states, refugees gain no 
advantage from their recognition by UNHCR: They don’t receive any material or financial 
support from the organisation, while they neither have access to the formal labour market, nor 
to schools or hospitals. This results from the Moroccan authorities’ decision to stop issuing 
residence permits to refugees recognised by UNHCR after the enormous increase in asylum 
applications the agency recorded following the opening of its new office in Rabat in 2005 
(Valluy 2007).  
Refugees repeatedly reacted to this treatment and during the last years raised several 
protests in front of the UNHCR office in Rabat (GADEM 2009).
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 In June 2009 more than 100 
of them organised a sit-in lasting several days, while UNHCR staff celebrated the World 
Refugee Day elsewhere (Sakhi 2009). Whereas refugees had demanded resident permits and 
financial support in previous campaigns, the Rassemblement pour Tous les Réfugiés au Maroc 
(RTRM) formed by the protesters only demanded their immediate resettlement to other 
countries. In addition, on 25 June 2009 they claimed in an open letter to the embassies of 
diverse European states the right to speak for themselves (RTRM 2009). Thereby, they 
challenged the legitimacy of UNHCR, which claims the monopoly to represent their interests 
in Morocco by referring to its mandate to find “permanent solutions for the problem of 
refugees” (UNHCR 2010a: 6). Moreover, the argumentation structure and the diction of the 
letter indicate that the protesting refugees appropriate UNHCR’s terminology:  
 
                                                          
4
 The phenomenon of refugee protests against UNHCR is not restricted to Morocco. Such protests have also 
been reported from Afghanistan, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Turkey and, most recently, Tunisia. 
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“Your Excellence, since the 15th of June 2009 we (women, men and children) have gathered 
in front of UNHCR’s office in order to demand our resettlement to a third country where the 
rights of refugees are respected.” (RTRM 2009) 
 
The ‘resettlement to a third country’ constitutes one of the three ‘durable solutions’ UNHCR 
foresees for refugees (UNHCR 2007b). Since they oppose to return to their countries of origin 
and regard their integration into the Moroccan society as impossible, the protesters count on 
the remaining ‘durable solution’ UNHCR has to offer. 
In an interview in February 2008, the head of UNHCR’s office in Rabat emphasises, 
however, that resettlement constitutes “a possibility, but not a right”. The appropriation of the 
term ‘resettlement’ by refugees results in a dissent about its scope, which French philosopher 
Jacques Rancière (2004) regards as the genuine feature of politics. The protests can therefore 
be read as an ”interruption of the UNHCR’s monopoly over the language of protection, care, 
and resettlement” (Moulin and Nyers 2007: 363). 
During previous protests, UNHCR tried to regain its authority as their sole legitimate 
advocate and its monopoly over the definition of politically disputed terms through a mixture 
of attempts to co-opt the demonstrators by means of informal negotiations and the 
simultaneous threat of police repression (Massamba 2006). In the past, refugees had always 
agreed to stop their protests as a precondition for informal negotiations with UNHCR. During 
the sit-in in June 2009, by contrast, the organisation only promised them negotiations after it 
had called the police, which violently dissolved the protest right in front of UNHCR’s office, 
leaving several participants badly injured (GADEM 2009). 
The strategy of co-optation becomes apparent in the attempt of the head of office to 
represent UNHCR’s office as the stage, but not the actual addressee of the protests. In an 
interview, the UNHCR chief of mission states:  
 
“We are the only address they can go to, we are the only valve where they can vent their 
frustration because we are the only ally they have, and they know this. At the end of the 
demonstration, we embrace each other and go the same way, but they want to make some 
publicity and we are the stage for it.” (Interview UNHCR Chief of Mission, Rabat, 2008)  
 
According to this interpretation, the protests are not directed against UNHCR, but against the 
Moroccan government, which refuses to issue the refugees with resident permits. This co-
optation is only possible for the head of UNHCR’s office by construing the content of refugee 
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demands and narratives in such a way that they comply with the UN agency’s institutional 
needs and objectives. This reductionist re-interpretation becomes obvious when it comes to 
the call for resettlement. To the question whether UNHCR should resettle all refugees as long 
as it cannot guarantee their physical safety and material well-being in Morocco, the chief of 
mission replied that in this case, there would be no imperative for the Moroccan government 
any longer to alter the present situation. In other words, UNHCR relies on the presence of 
refugees in Morocco as a means to exercise political pressure on the Moroccan authorities in 
order to make them, in view of the visible “plight of the refugees” (Nyers 2006: 3), 
acknowledge the existence of a ‘refugee problem’ in the country which needs to be addressed 
through the implementation of a national asylum system.  
Numerous scholars have underscored that the ascribed helplessness of refugees 
constitutes the major feature of their representation in the refugee protection discourse as 
articulated by NGOs and UNHCR. From this representation of refugees their supposed need 
for help and protection is derived, which in turn authorises the latter organisations in their 
function as protectors, providers and advocates of refugees (Malkki 1996; Nyers 2006; Soguk 
1999). Refugees are constructed as ‘speechless emissaries’, whose ability to judge is limited 
due to the experiences leading to their flight. Supposedly, they are therefore in need of an 
advocate, who represents their interests, as they are not capable of doing so on their own. 
Hence, the ability of refugees to act independently as political subjects is denied by means of 
their victimisation (Malkki 1996). Instead, they are reduced to passive recipients of assistance 
and objects of knowledge production. As Peter Nyers has aptly put it: “Refugees are silenced 
by the very discourses that attempt to provide solutions to their plight” (2006: XIV). 
What UNHCR’s decision to respond to refugee protests with brutal police operations 
uncovers is the violent character of the asymmetric power relation inscribed in the refugee 
protection discourse. From the agency’s perspective, the criminalisation of the protests 
appears, indeed, as necessary, because the participating refugees enact themselves as 
independently acting, political subjects. Thereby, they directly challenge the legitimacy of 
UNHCR’s proxy policies as well as its authority as their advocate. This example points out 
that the criminalisation of the majority of migrants also includes refugees as soon as the latter 
break away from the subject position of victims in need of help and protection ascribed to 
them. It is exactly this authoritarian character that moves the UNHCR’s own refugee 
protection discourse in close relation with the political rationality of migration management. 
As Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud point out, the concept of migration management “is 
full of normative assumptions of how actors should behave, defining the ‘good’ migrant to be 
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‘well-informed, respectful of the law, flexible to market needs, ready to circulate and eager to 
contribute to the development of their home country” (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 17). 
Likewise, the refugee protection discourse is full of obligations and norms prescribing the 
appropriate behaviour of a ‘good refugee’. Once people on the move are labelled within these 
rationalities as not fitting into the narrow channels of legitimate behaviour, the authoritarian 
potentials of both the refugee protection and the migration management discourse come to the 
fore, converging and materialising in restrictive and sometimes manifestly violent measures 
that seek to force ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ back into the tracks laid out for them. 
 
4. UNHCR, Migration Management and the ‘National Order of Things’ 
In the end, both the authoritarian character of the refugee protection discourse and the de-
legitimisation of the mobility of the majority of migrants are implicated in the victimisation of 
refugees. Peter Nyers suggests that the victimisation of refugees follows from their 
construction as the negative of the (nation-state) citizen. Accordingly, refugees are defined as 
suffering from a twofold lack in comparison. First, refugees do not belong to a national 
community. Due to this ‘deficit’ their ability and right to political participation are denied. 
Second, refugees no longer stand under the protection of a nation-state order. From this ‘lack’ 
a need for help and protection is derived, through which UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organisations authorise themselves to act on their behalf (Nyers 2006). 
Consequently, the construction and representation of refugees as passive victims bereft 
of political agency and in need of help, advocacy and protection is only possible because the 
refugee protection discourse presumes sovereign nation-states as unquestioned and pre-given 
facts (Lui 2004; Soguk 1999). Through this methodological nationalism the nation-state is 
naturalised as a form of political organisation, while citizenship is essentialised as a form of 
political identity (Glick-Schiller and Wimmer 2003). Solely inside this “national order of 
things” refugees can be pathologised as an anomaly requiring “therapeutic interventions” 
(Malkki 1995: 508-512). At the same time, the problematisation of the refugee as a figure 
reproduces, at least implicitly, the category of the nation state citizen as a positive and 
worthwhile alternative draft (Lui 2004; Soguk 1999). Refugees are, by contrast, reduced to a 
bundle of material needs by the refugee protection discourse and thereby to a ‘problem’ 
requiring a ‘humanitarian’ solution. The political context by which they have become 
refugees is masked (Malkki 1995). The refugee protection discourse and UNHCR’s practices 
do then not only de-politicise refugees themselves, but also their presence. 
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It is precisely this methodological nationalism and its depoliticising effect, which 
UNHCR’s refugee protection discourse shares with the migration management paradigm. The 
International Agenda for Migration Management relies on the unquestioned premise, that 
“one aspect of a state’s responsibility to protect its own population and territory is the 
authority to determine who may enter and remain” (Berne Initiative 2005: 5). In addition to 
their shared authoritarian character, methodological nationalism can therefore be considered 
as the second underlying reason for the compatibility of UNHCR’s refugee protection 
discourse with the political rationality of migration management. Third, it is exactly the 
depoliticising effect of the term ‘migration management’, which represents border and 
migration controls as purely bureaucratic, rational and apolitical means to solve supposedly 
entirely technical problems (Geiger and Pécoud 2010), that permits UNHCR to widen its field 
of activities in the realm of migration policy, although its original statute defines it as a 
strictly humanitarian and non-political organisation, whose mandate is restricted to matters of 
asylum. 
Yet, the three measures propagated by UNHCR as ‘durable solutions’ for the so-called 
‘refugee problem’ confirm that humanitarianism does not constitute a separate sphere beyond 
the political, but an inherently political concept and rationality of migration management 
itself. The ‘repatriation’ as well as the ‘reintegration’ into the receiving society, just as the 
‘resettlement’ into a third country, are all aimed at retransforming the ‘anomaly’ of refugees 
into the ‘normality’ of state citizens (Nyers 2006). Thereby, UNHCR re-establishes the 
nation-state order, whose constitution and reproduction is based on the systematic use of 
violence, by which refugees are created as a permanent phenomenon in the first place (Lui 
2004). From this perspective, it is not so much refugees that pose a problem demanding a 
solution, but the principle of the nation-state, which UNHCR restores and reproduces through 
its own politics of migration management.  
 
Conclusion  
UNHCR’s embracing of the migration management paradigm as well as its active 
engagement in respective activities bring to the fore that the UN agency forms part of a global 
police of populations. As we have shown, all of UNHCR’s three durable solutions aim at 
retransforming the ‘anomaly’ of refugees back into the ’normality‘ of nation state citizens. 
This rationale of UNHCR’s refugee protection regime reflects the governmentality of police, 
which is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of the conditions of a specific 
order (Dean 1999), in this case, the ‘national order of things’.  
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The drive towards “permanent, continually renewed, and increasingly detailed 
regulation” that characterises the governmentality of police (Foucault 2007: 340) is reflected 
in the numerous handbooks that have been published by UNHCR. These handbooks regulate 
any detail of the RSD procedure, the conditions of the detention, ‘repatriation’, ‘resettlement’ 
or ‘reintegration’ of refugees as well as their legitimate behaviour in the most meticulous 
manner. As a result of this “regulation mania” (Dean 1999: 91), refugee protection is 
inherently authoritarian in regards to those it seeks to govern. This becomes apparent in the 
repressive way UNHCR deals with refugee protests in Morocco. 
The underlying endeavour of the refugee protection discourse to ‘order’ migration, 
which it shares with the political rationality of migration management, is reflected in 
UNHCR’s promotion of migration management procedures in both Morocco and Turkey as a 
supposedly necessary precondition for an effective refugee protection. Since the broadening 
of UNHCR’s agenda occurs in the context of ongoing problems to secure sufficient funding, 
new activities in this domain take place at the cost of previous practices. This change of 
activities indicates a considerable shift in the performance and appearance of the refugee 
protection regime as a whole, which deepens and widens UNHCR’s role in the global police 
of populations. 
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